In games. Can someone play with the Constitution and democratic institutions? Can issues such as the substitution of the Constitution revision process, provided for in Article 110, be opened by referendum? What does the strengthening of the President of the Republic's powers and his direct election by the electoral body mean for the parliamentary character of our regime? What impact will the possible introduction of the simple proportional electoral system without revising the constitutional provisions regulating the appointment of the respective government have on the regime, and especially on political stability?
Is the Constitution to blame for the multidimensional crisis the country is experiencing? Can the exit from the crisis be achieved through a constitutional consideration of the Greek issue, or are other, much more complex conditions required?
Can there be a serious and responsible discussion on the revision of the Constitution without basic conditions of political and constitutional consensus? Without historical memory and awareness of the country's institutional heritage? While there are unprecedented problems in the judiciary, in independent authorities, in the media landscape?
What are the margins of discretion of the national revising legislator in the context of the European crisis and the new correlations arising from the combination of economic crisis, refugee crisis, security crisis, and Brexit?

Nikos Alivizatos, Stavros Tsakyrakis, and Evangelos Venizelos were called upon to answer these and many other related questions in a public discussion entitled "In games": A discussion on the Constitution and democracy", organized by the Circle of Ideas for National Reconstruction on June 30, 2016, with Elias Kanelis as the moderator.